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The Feasibility of Averting Collapse: the Resurgence of Georgia’s 
Agricultural Sector
Juan Echanove, Strasbourg
Abstract
About half of Georgia’s workforce are farmers to some extent and size, and agriculture and rural identities 
are fundamental components of the nation’s identity. Georgia’s economic and societal collapse during the 
1990s ruined the agricultural sector, which was also largely neglected during Saakashvili’s neoliberal reform 
government (2004–2012). In the last few years, however, there has been a noticeable incipient revival of agri-
culture; this is largely due to a coherent set of ambitious policies, including innovative private-public part-
nerships, the re-establishment of the food safety systems and the promotion of market-driven small farmers’ 
cooperatives. These policies are already delivering results, including improvements in productivity, produc-
tion and exports. Georgian agriculture, as “third-world” as it was in the 1990s, was one of the worst among 
the post-communist countries for more than two decades but is now becoming a promising economic sector.
The Post-Independence Disintegration
Historically, Georgia is a traditional, agricultural coun-
try. Its diversified soils and ecosystems provide opti-
mal conditions for quality production. Agriculture has 
always been a core element of the nations’ economic 
fabric even after the industrialization during the Soviet 
times. However, food and agriculture are much more 
than economic assets in Georgia: they are an integral 
part of its sociocultural ethos and identity. The South 
Caucasian nation is well-known as the land where wine 
production was allegedly first developed and as the home 
of a  rich, rural-based cuisine. Much of the wine, tea, 
fruits and vegetables found across the USSR came from 
Georgia, which had one of the highest levels of agri-
cultural productivity among all of the union’s constit-
uent republics. However, after the collapse of the USSR, 
Georgian agriculture experienced a total disintegration.
Unrest, armed conflicts, the secession of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, lawlessness, and massive corruption 
brought the country and its society to the edge of disin-
tegration. Virtually, all of the existing agriculture infra-
structure and equipment (irrigation systems, warehouses, 
tractors, combine harvesters, etc.) were dismantled for 
scrap. In parallel, a sudden and poorly planned privati-
zation process resulted in the breakdown of the former 
Soviet collective farms into small plots, which were then 
distributed to rural families including those who lacked 
the background and skills of farmers. In the short-term, 
this massive land reform helped prevent the country from 
falling into a humanitarian crisis and requiring food aid. 
People were able to cultivate something to survive. On 
the other hand, instead of their privatization as limited 
companies or business-oriented cooperatives, the options 
selected in other post-Soviet countries, the breakdown 
of the collective farms transformed the agroindustry of 
the pre-independence times into subsistence agriculture.
By 1992, half a million Georgian families had turned 
into small farmers, producing minimal amounts of food, 
which were often insufficient to place production in the 
markets. Rural Georgia became a pre-modern economy 
where money and salaried jobs were almost absent. With 
neither investments nor access to fertilizers, pesticides 
and other inputs, yields declined to levels of parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Many plots were left uncultivated. By 
1995, Georgia’s sown area was 45 percent smaller than 
it was in 1990, and the number of livestock was reduced 
by half. This primitive agriculture was unable to supply 
the urban areas that were relying on food imports from 
Russia and Turkey, often controlled by well-connected 
mafia groups who worked via South Ossetia, Armenia 
and Turkey.
For the first time in modern history, Georgia became 
a net importer of agricultural products. After the initial 
dark and chaotic years following the country’s indepen-
dence, the Shevardnadze administration gradually man-
aged to bring some stability although they were unable 
to tackle corruption and place the country in the path 
of substantial economic growth. The declining trend of 
agriculture started to change somewhat for the better. By 
the year 2000, the cultivated area was increasing close 
to the levels of the final Soviet times, and farm produc-
tivity was modestly increasing.
The (Near) Death Knell of Doctrinal 
Libertarianism
The Saakashvili government, which took power in 2004, 
has been praised for its impressive performance in crack-
ing down on mafia dons and the worst corruption. In 
addition, it has been praised for implementing mas-
sive economic reforms, as well as reputedly placing the 
country back in the path of modernization. Neverthe-
less, not much changed in the small villages of Geor-
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gia during the aftermath of Mikheil Saakashvili’s take-
over other than improvements on some roads and better 
access to a reliable supply of gas and electricity. Addi-
tionally, the agricultural sector started to decline again, 
losing the modest gains that occurred during the latter 
part of the Shevardnadze period. By 2008, the sown 
area reached a historical minimum of a mere 329,000 
hectares, almost half the sown area of the year 2000.
Despite a very favorable economic context with high 
growth rates and massive augmentation in public reve-
nues, agriculture remained the forgotten sector of the 
economy in terms of governmental priorities. The state’s 
allocations to the Ministry of Agriculture declined mas-
sively. By 2010, the government was investing only 0.3 
percent of its budget in agriculture, becoming a coun-
try with one of the smallest funds for the primary sector 
worldwide. Additionally, half of the people were farmers 
(one of the highest percentages in the post-Soviet sphere), 
and the agriculture was still contributing to a substantial 
16 percent of the GDP during certain years. The agricul-
ture extension system was dismantled, and the district-
level offices of the competent agriculture-related minis-
tries and government agencies were closed.
The remaining state-owned agriculture assets, includ-
ing arable lands that were not yet privatized, were sold in 
rather obscure auctions. Most animal vaccination cam-
paigns ceased, causing the spread of new epidemics such 
as African swine flu, which killed the near-totality of 
the country’s pig population in 2007. The sanitary and 
phytosanitary or SPS border controls were stopped, and 
the units were dismantled. Food inspections were can-
celled, causing a worrisome augmentation of foodborne 
diseases. In short, Georgia became one of the few coun-
tries in the world that officially and consciously demol-
ished its food safety system. It is difficult to assess the 
actual damage caused by these essentially nihilistic pol-
icies, mainly because, as part of this same attitude, the 
official agriculture statistics deliberately ceased to be col-
lected and updated. However, there is massive anecdotal 
evidence of the enormous alienation and despair that 
they caused among the already impoverished farmers. 
Still, agriculture remained an important, albeit declin-
ing, sector in terms of economic contribution, net for-
eign exchange and employment.
There are various reasons to explain why the Saa-
kashvili administration de facto dismissed agriculture. 
First, there were ideological motivations. Libertarian-
ism, an extreme version of economic liberalism, became 
the de facto ideology of the regime. Libertarians pro-
fess the total withdrawal of the state from all the sec-
tors of the economy other than the protection of pri-
vate property, security and defense. However, in practice 
and despite all the official rhetoric, the state contin-
ued intervening in most other sectors of the economy, 
often substantially. Only in agriculture, the libertarian 
dogmas were followed down to its most extreme prac-
tice. Fighting against corruption, which was rampant in 
the Eduard Shevardnadze times, was also an important 
reason behind the dismantling of the agricultural pub-
lic structures. However, contrary to other public func-
tions, such as the patrol and traffic police which were 
disbanded and re-created from scratch, the state agrono-
mists and border inspectors or officials were terminated 
without replacement.
Another explanation is the particular interpreta-
tion of modernity that Saakashvili, his entourage and 
his ideological mentors wanted for Georgia, which was 
strongly associated with futuristic urban developments 
and very negative towards the legacy of traditional rural 
life. Things turned almost histrionic when the city state 
of Singapore officially became the recurrent aspirational 
model for the ‘new’ Georgia by 2009. Finally, a less evi-
dent motivation but perhaps more important than any 
ideological driver, was the vested interest by some polit-
ical and business circles to obtain easy economic gains. 
Many of the privatized agriculture-related assets ended 
in the hands of figures who were well-linked to the gov-
ernment. This included former minister of economy and 
libertarian pundit Kakha Bendukidze, who obtained 
the property of the Tbilisi Agrarian University with-
out a due tender.
The removal of the sanitary border controls favored 
various food importing groups who were allegedly con-
nected with governmental officials. The post-Soviet land 
privatization process, total absence of a coherent agri-
culture policy and political animosity to the sector all 
left a paltry legacy. Another factor further worsening 
the situation was the deterioration of its relations with 
Russia and the brief South Ossetia War in the summer 
of 2008, which caused a total ban by Russia of Geor-
gian wine, mineral water and other foodstuffs, prevent-
ing the Georgian producers to reach what was still, after 
all, their first external market.
From Reluctant Reanimation Attempts…
The year 2010 marked the lowest point for the Georgian 
agriculture. Exports collapsed, yields rapidly declined 
and food prices climbed. Without any doubt, the mas-
sive failure of Georgian agriculture to modernize was 
the root cause of the persistence of high poverty levels 
in the rural areas. Some circles within the government, 
especially around the very influential Vano Meravishbili 
who was designated prime minister by Saakashvili in 
2012, started realizing that the ruling party could risk 
losing ground in the rural areas if no tangible changes 
would be delivered to the farmers. A modest augmen-
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tation of the budget for agriculture was approved—the 
first in 15 years—and some highly visible, although 
not very effective, programs were promoted. These pro-
grams included some subsidies, as well as the establish-
ment of a network of sophisticated agriculture service 
centers, albeit not really adequate to match the needs 
of the small farmers.
In 2010, the European Union and Georgia started 
negotiations for an association agreement and a Deep 
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agree-
ment, which would gradually fully open Georgia to the 
EU market and bring the country politically closer to 
the European Union. Beyond its economic significance, 
the agreements were perceived as a main step for the 
realization of the country’s European aspirations. The 
DCFTA agreement would require Georgia to mend its 
SPS system gradually in order to become more compat-
ible with EU standards and legislation. This process was 
at odds with the still-dominant libertarian approaches, 
which had been destroying Georgian agriculture. The 
EU started providing substantial technical support, but 
some of the most radical elements within the govern-
ment’s economic structures sabotaged the process as 
much as they could.
… To Steady Revitalization
In autumn of 2012, against all odds, Saakashvili’s 
National Movement badly lost the parliamentary elec-
tions, defeated by Georgian Dream, a coalition of dis-
affected groups formed around the billionaire and phi-
lanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili. The impact of the South 
Ossetia War and the anonymous disclosure of video 
material, just a few days before the elections, showing 
human rights abuses committed by government offi-
cials were the main triggers of the electorate’s choice. 
Nonetheless, the long-standing disenchantment of the 
farmers and rural dwellers also played a  major role 
despite years of abandonment by the administration. 
Revitalizing agriculture was one of the key political slo-
gans of Ivanishvili.
The new administration, in fact, made moderniza-
tion of agriculture one of the top economic priorities. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, run by a new team of com-
mitted professionals and advised by experts from the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the EU, 
installed a battery of ambitious reforms. These reforms 
included the approval of an agriculture sector multiyear 
strategy, the enactment of key SPS and food safety legis-
lations, the restoration of the food control systems and 
the recruitment and deployment of agriculture advi-
sors all across the country. To update statistics, a door-
to-door national agriculture census was conducted in 
2014 for the first time in a decade. In 2013, an agree-
ment was reached with Russia to lift the embargo on 
Georgian food imports, and in 2014 the DCFTA agree-
ment was signed with the European Union. Along with 
the improvement in the quantity and quality of produc-
tion, this better context permitted an augmentation of 
agriculture exports, from US$349 million in 2010 to 
US$824 million in 2014.
An innovative system that consisted of the distribu-
tion of vouchers that small farmers could use for acqui-
ring fertilizers and other agricultural inputs from private 
providers of their choice, permitted a massive augmen-
tation of the sown area for the first time in two decades. 
Some 700,000 farmers are benefiting from this scheme 
every year. A similar model of private-public partner-
ship was also developed to enhance access to credit. The 
government signed agreements with virtually all of the 
financing institutions to grant a portion of the interest 
rates for agricultural funding.
Because of better investments and increased access 
to inputs, productivity increased significantly. In 2015, 
the average yield of wheat reached 2.6 tons per hectare, 
compared to 1 ton per hectare in 2010. During the same 
period, the number of livestock increased from 1 mil-
lion heads to 1.3 million.
The promotion of business-oriented cooperatives was 
another key aspect of the sector reforms. The underly-
ing logic was that by organizing themselves into coop-
eratives, Georgian small farmers could exploit econ-
omies of scale and increase their capacity to compete 
in the market.
It was believed that, in principle, many Georgian 
farmers were going to be reluctant to form cooperatives, 
feeling that this would mean a return to the Soviet col-
lective farms. Therefore, massive awareness campaigns 
were conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, NGOs 
and the farmers’ organizations, explaining the role and 
functioning of Western-style market-oriented coopera-
tives. In 2013, a progressive law on farmers’ cooperatives 
was enacted, creating tax incentives, and an Agriculture 
Cooperatives Agency was established, providing capacity 
building to the farmer groups. Various projects, funded 
by the EU and implemented mainly via NGOs, provided 
technical assistance and grants for capital investments.
The Remaining Land Issue(s)
These efforts paid off. By mid-2016, 1,640 agriculture 
cooperatives were established all over the country. The 
reforms required a substantial augmentation of public 
funding. By 2015, the government was investing ten 
times more in agriculture than it did in 2011. Still, these 
financial resources were not a large burden for the pub-
lic finances as they consisted of only 3 percent of the 
state budget, or the equivalent of approximately 100 
CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 88, 26 October 2016 5
million euros, plus some 30 million euros per year from 
various donors (mainly the European Union, the Inter-
national Fund for Agricultural Development, USAID 
and Switzerland), including direct budget support by 
the EU to the state upon fulfillment of pre-agreed con-
ditions. Long-term commitment by the government, 
professional management and a  strong collaboration 
with the civil society have been the key aspects of the 
positive progress.
Of course, a  number of challenges remain to be 
solved so that Georgian agriculture can fulfill its poten-
tial, including completing the land registration process, 
improving the access to finance and micro-finance by 
small farmers, and defining and promoting more holistic 
rural development policies. Beyond agriculture, solutions 
to these challenges will also preserve the natural resources 
and solve environmental issues as well as create non-farm-
ing job opportunities for rural people. It is still too early to 
see how the early gains of the reform will be consolidated 
in the long-run. Agriculture policies require patience and 
continued efforts to deliver sustainable results. What is 
already certain, however, is that after twenty-five years 
of falling and lagging behind, thousands of Georgian 
small farmers are now starting to catch-up.
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Armenia’s Agricultural Sector: From the Subsistence Line to Discrete 
Take-Off?
Virginie-Anne Dubois, Orléans
Abstract
This contribution discusses the overall lay-out and (re-) orientation of Armenia’s agricultural sector since 
it decreased to subsistence levels and a virtual standstill in the early 1990s. Promising due to both a set of 
favorable, natural-physical conditions and agricultural traditions, part of which survived Soviet agricultural 
policies and the country’s “transition” and integration in the world economy following its collapse. Arme-
nia’s agriculture and agro-industry have had a timid resurgence in the past few years. Driven by the emer-
gence of small and medium-sized farms and the regionalization of a number of primary sector activities and 
the presence of markets in Russia and the Persian-Arab Gulf, the potential of Armenia’s agriculture remains 
stunted, however, by the country’s land-locked position and the border blockades that have been in effect 
since the Nagorno-Karabakh War, both of which are obstacles for proper agricultural exports.
Enclaved Twice
Situated at the heart of the Lesser Caucasus, the smaller 
of the two chains that form the greater Caucasus range, 
Armenia is the smallest of the successor states of the 
USSR if non-recognized states such as Transnistria and 
Nagorno Karabakh are excluded. With approximately 
98% of its population consisting of ethnic Armenians, 
it is also linguistically and ethnically one of the most 
homogenous. Like most other constituent republics of 
the USSR, it became independent in late 1991 and has 
been going through similar episodes of radical social 
and economic changes and “transitions,” which also 
naturally and dramatically affected its rural areas and 
its agricultural sector. There is a particular aspect about 
Armenia in relation to its primary sector and its agri-
cultural potential since we are discussing a sector that 
is directly dependent on physical geography.
Two aspects are of interest: First, there is Arme-
nia’s landlocked status and its geographic-political iso-
lation since the political turbulences during its early 
independence years. Second, there is its mountainous 
character, consisting mainly of highlands. Indeed, the 
first factors are decisive in its relations with the neigh-
boring states and in the organization and viability of 
trade routes for raw agricultural produce as well as for 
processed agro-industrial products. The second real-
ity heavily determines the possibilities for region-based 
agricultural diversification as well as the cultural prac-
tices connected to these regions. Contrary to Georgia, 
which has direct access to the Black Sea, and Azerbai-
jan, which has direct access to the Caspian Sea, Arme-
nia has no maritime front. Since the Nagorno-Karabakh 
War (1988–94), eighty percent of its borders, more spe-
cifically those with Azerbaijan and with the latter’s ally 
Turkey, are closed, with no possibility for people and 
goods to officially pass.
Thus, deprived of a major economic asset, namely, 
access to the sea, agricultural trade and access to poten-
tial markets face a double impediment. This predicament 
also determines the nature and direction of Armenia’s 
exports and imports. For the time being, Armenian agri-
cultural goods are largely dependent on transport routes 
north into Georgia and on to the Black Sea and the Rus-
sian markets and on the southern route and the border 
crossing into Iran at Agarak for access to the Middle East-
ern and Persian-Arab Gulf markets. The blockade and 
the limited number of export routes and surcharges on 
products caused by it are obstructing not only the expan-
sion of trade networks but also the emergence of parallel 
trade, which is particularly burdensome for economic 
development and for the growth of a proper tax base.
The Highlands, Impediment or Asset?
One of the driving forces of Armenia, one of which 
is also a key pillar of its development, consists of the 
wealth of agricultural practices, which are derived from 
an ancestral know-how in the fields of cultivation and 
artisanal processing. The relationship between the nat-
ural environment and the conditions for agricultural 
development are dependent on the benefits and con-
straints of the geographical situation of Armenia, par-
ticularly on the mountainous environment to which it 
belongs. Regardless of altitude, the mountainous envi-
ronment in agricultural development is crucial because 
Armenia’s territory is essentially uniformly highland. 
The country’s average altitude is 1,800 meters. About 
ninety percent of its area is situated above 1,000 meters, 
and three-quarters are above 1,500 meters, while the 
peak of Mount Aragats, north of the capital Yerevan, 
culminates at 4,090 meters.
The altitude and the country’s staged relief form the 
components of the agricultural landscape, which also 
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benefits from a continental climate with large temper-
ature variations; summer temperatures can increase to 
over forty degrees centigrade and in winter temper-
atures can decrease as low as negative 40 in some areas. 
At approximately 2,500 hours, annually, the rate of sun-
shine exposure is very high. In addition, two large drain-
age basins, which are jointly nicknamed “the water tower 
of the southern Caucasus,” cover the majority of irriga-
tion needs. The Aras River forms the border with Turkey. 
The Kura River flows in Azerbaijan, Georgia and into 
the Turkish province of Kars but has a number of trib-
utaries that flow into the Armenian territory. Lake Sevan, 
one of the world’s oldest and largest mountain lakes, 
which, perched at 1,900 meters, constitutes a hydro-
logical reserve of 32.8 cubic kilometers, is also part of 
the geography. Objectively, these are excellent condi-
tions for the rehabilitation and development of a solid 
agricultural base. The regional particularities resulting 
from the configuration of the relief and the topography 
divide the country into an array of vast high-altitude 
plains, basins, trays and peaks and compose a remark-
able diversity in the conditions of farming.
History as Agrarian Destiny
After this concise presentation of Armenia’s natural con-
ditions, which result from its geographical location, it is 
also necessary to take into account a number of histori-
cal factors in order to inform our statements relating to 
developments in the agricultural sector. If there is no 
doubt about the ancient nature of Armenia’s environ-
ment-specific agriculture, archaeological evidence shows 
that six thousand years ago, amphoras were used to pre-
serve and export fruits and wine in these parts of the 
Southern Caucasus. The country’s formation and inte-
gration in the USSR in the late 1920s sealed the main 
directions of its agricultural development for the next 
seven decades. Indeed, the application of socialist-stat-
ist production and management principles in the field 
of agricultural production has led to the replacement of 
a system based on the peasantry by an industrial mode 
of agricultural work. Of course, between 1929 and 1936, 
the Armenian SSR did not escape the collectivization of 
the means of production and of the land.
Once it was dissolved along with the USSR itself, 
this form of industrialized and heavily ideologized agri-
culture, which was in the end often disconnected from 
contemporary developments, left a pernicious legacy 
(supply deficits, soil depletion, quantitative and qualita-
tive degradation of flocks, etc.). In addition to old culti-
vations and practices, more so-called “technical” crops 
were introduced, which were dependent on heavy irri-
gation and whose production quota were determined by 
the central state plan. However, after 1991, the transi-
tion from a statist and bureaucratic agrarian system to 
a privatized one led to the appearance of a large segment 
of small and medium-sized household farms along with 
impoverishment and an upheaval of modes of produc-
tion, as it did in many successor countries of the USSR. 
If, shortly before the dissolution of the USSR, agricul-
ture represented less than twenty percent of both the 
official GDP and employment of the Armenian SSR, it 
rose in prominence due to the food security needs of the 
population facing uncertainty during the first phases of 
transition and the collapse of the non-agricultural and 
social sectors to one-third of the GDP and 40 percent 
of employment by 1999.1
The former 869 large collective and state farms on 
approximately 147,000 separate parcels of land were 
privatized to create approximately 338,000 farms and 
rural households with relatively small plots, with an 
average size of 1.1 hectares. Nonetheless, neither social-
ism, reduction in agricultural productivity, transition, 
or more rapacious form of capitalism, which imme-
diately followed, fully obliterated traditional practices 
and local specificities. The stark reduction in the sizes of 
farms and plots after 1991 even made the use of heavy 
and costly machinery designed for vast spaces super-
fluous. Thus since its independence, once the country 
and its society were gradually integrated into the global 
economy, Armenia has constantly been confronted with 
a new economic environment and the challenges of adap-
tation. The collapse of socialism, the planned economy 
and the disappearance of central subsidies guaranteed 
markets both in the USSR and its wider socialist com-
monwealth, but the severing of export channels were not 
the only shock the country had to cope with.
From Socialism to Subsistence
The economic and infrastructural damages caused by 
the Spitak earthquake in late 1988 further weakened the 
already stagnating socialist economy of what was then 
still the Armenian SSR. The overall situation of heavily 
dislocated agriculture and the decline of food security 
and supplies were further worsened by the Nagorno-
Karabakh War that started at approximately the same 
time in a country with a clear agricultural vocation and 
destiny. Armenia’s passage to a market economy and 
its integration in the world economy that came with 
its independence also made its economy, including its 
agricultural component, vulnerable for the first time 
since Armenia’s creation as a modern nation-state to 
1 Millns, John (2013), Agriculture and rural cooperation examples 
from Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, Policy Studies on Rural 
Transition no. 2013-2, Budapest  : FAO Regional Office for 
Europe and Central Asia, p. 11–12.
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conjectural shifts and external competition. The result 
were starkly decreasing yields and overall productiv-
ity. Until the 2000s, the primary sector was by far the 
least productive.
Many agro-industrial factories also closed down due 
to the severing of commodity and spare part supplies and 
the disappearance of their markets. At the same time, 
during the first years following the collapse of the USSR, 
many Armenians, being faced with shortages and unem-
ployment, sought refuge in the fertile countryside to 
engage in plot agriculture on land from which they first 
removed industrial crops such as cotton, tobacco and 
sugar beets to replace them with more diversified food 
crops. Rural society in this most southern (together with 
Turkmenistan) of the former states of the USSR man-
aged to conserve a number of traditional agro-pastoralist 
practices and a strong orchard and vegetable gardening 
culture as well as a certain amount of knowledge in the 
field of treatment, processing and stocking of produce. 
All of these practices were and remain rooted in a rather 
strong social fabric and family-centered culture.
With independence also came international aid from 
both donor institutions and from the Armenian diaspora 
in the U.S., Western Europe, Russia and the Middle East. 
Thanks to a number of technical support programs from 
donors in the US, Russia, the EU, specialized interna-
tional organizations, and of course the inputs of Arme-
nian farmers and workforce themselves, the negative 
agricultural growth curves have been gradually reversed 
since the mid-2000s. Towards the end of the 2000s and 
the beginning of the 2010s, there seems to be a sustain-
able rebound of agricultural production with a stronger 
agricultural infrastructure, a regular renewal of equip-
ment, a renewed marketing in the food industry and, 
therefore, a return of demand and orders. New or reha-
bilitated larger-size industrial structures with foreign—
mostly Russian and Diaspora-Armenian—capital coex-
ist near much smaller structures whose operations are 
sometimes based at the village or at the regional level. 
Regardless, the essential is that a revival of the primary 
sector can be observed.
The Plateau Backbone
Agricultural economics remains a pillar of development 
due to the numerous benefits of favorable physical and 
historical conditions that allows pastoralism, gardening 
and, vegetable, fruit production to join livestock rais-
ing. The plateaus that are situated around the moun-
tains, which are sometimes carved by gorges and can-
yons, are located in the northern Lori province on the 
Shirak high plains around Gyumri, around Lake Sevan, 
and in Armenia’s southern “tail.” These spaces are quite 
suitable for the cultivation of cereals and potatoes, which 
are both staple foods. In the early 1990s, industrial crops 
were removed from the fields in the high plains in order 
to replace them with these and other food crops to meet 
basic food needs. Since the mid-2000s, potato growing 
has become a regional specialty of the Shirak plateau 
and the Lake Sevan region, which ho jointly ensure more 
than half of the national production. The high prices 
for potatoes also led to a situation where they are often 
grown in city courtyards. Similarly, the agricultural 
machinery park was gradually replaced, even if globally, 
and still tends to be rather obsolete.
It is also largely in these mountainous regions, plus 
the hills of Aragatsotn close to the capital that the pas-
toral dimension and vocation of the Armenian coun-
tryside manifest itself. People have always taken advan-
tage of the complementarity of spaces by adapting their 
lifestyles to bioclimatic terracing. However, if this trait 
is common in many parts of the highlands, the south-
west of Armenia has a different rationale: the transhu-
mance practices have long been steered by the cross-bor-
der nature of the southern Caucasus countries, especially 
those between Armenia and the Azerbaijani exclave of 
Nakhchivan (Naxçıvan). Currently, it is no longer pos-
sible to observe the same practices given the border clo-
sures. This sector has also not escaped the difficulties 
of post-Soviet transition because it has been confronted 
with the reduction of forage areas due to the new bor-
ders, the slaughtering of livestock for immediate con-
sumption, the inability to maintain herds up to level, 
and the failure to improve the gene pool of the cattle. 
However, cattle remain at the heart of the Armenian 
pastoral economy and is also increasing. Sheep farming, 
which is ancient to the area and a traditional activity of 
Armenia’s Yezidi and Kurdish minorities, has increased 
because of the emergence of markets in Iran and high-
income countries around the Persian–Arab Gulf.
The emergence of terroirs
Poultry farming is also experiencing a  recent revitali-
zation with a better control of the sector, whereas pig 
raising is still hindered of its potential by the competi-
tion from Russia, a clear lack of technical capacity to 
properly manage the activity, and the limited genetic 
potential of the Armenian pigs. Finally, irrigated areas 
and lower foothills are particularly conducive to garden-
ing, fruit growing and viticulture or grape cultivation. 
The Plain of Ararat, which is situated north of the valley 
of the Aras and irrigated by the Sevan and Aras drain-
age complex, is the most fertile depression of Armenia. 
It is bounded to the north by Mount Aragats and to 
the south by Mount Ararat (called Masis in Armenian), 
and although it is a national symbol of Armenia, it is 
located in Turkey (where it is called Ağrı Dağı). There 
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are many historical accounts about these areas; these 
accounts describe the idyllic nature of these fertile areas 
and the array of product growing there because of the 
silt that is deposited by the Aras River and the warm 
summer months. Additionally, the area currently grows 
produce as diverse as melons, peaches, apricots, pome-
granates, grapes, cucumbers, tomatoes, eggplants and 
peppers. The western Armavir and Ararat regions pro-
vide three quarters of Armenia’s fruit and vegetable pro-
duction, a net increase since the mid-2000s.
Similarly, the vineyard is an iconic culture of Arme-
nia and marks its identity because its core cultivation 
area is situated in the wide piedmont of Mount Ararat 
where, according to Biblical and popular tradition, Noah 
and his entourage quenched their thirst after the retreat 
of the deluge. Local grape varieties grow and develop in 
this southwestern part of Armenia and are maintained 
through an old tradition of vinification. One example 
is in Areni, where wine-making is believed to go back 
approximately six thousand years. Having also suffered 
the impact of socialist-statist modes of production and 
management and its subsequent collapse, a critical mass 
of cultivated land area is maintained and has gradually 
expanded. However, production is primarily increasing, 
which highlights an increase in yields through better 
control of wine-making and as well as a new dynamic 
of the winemaking process.
Time for Agro-Investment
Except for the last decade, Armenia’s agricultural out-
put generally showed a  rising trend (see Figure 1 on 
p. 10); it is necessary to consolidate the output, initially 
to continuously meet local needs. Indeed, as can be 
seen in Figure 2 on p. 11, the trade balance of Armenia 
is in deficit, and the country imports foodstuffs that it 
could adequately and sufficiently produce itself. Addi-
tionally, the storing and processing infrastructure, which 
are both the real missing links in the entire chain, may 
need to be restructured. This restructuring is necessary 
not only to optimize the Armenian agricultural poten-
tial and to meet both domestic needs but also to meet 
external requests in order to reset the trade balance and 
counter the harmful effects of the blockade. Finally, we 
must question the valorization of production, which 
necessarily involves the notion of quality, adapted to 
the Armenian singularity, to highlight the existence 
of terroirs, regions with specific agricultural traditions 
and comparative advantages in their production. The 
industrial as well as artisanal means of processing can be 
a vehicle to allow the value of these quality productions.
Over the years, a number of structures that are born 
from local and regional initiatives and cooperation net-
works between various actors are operational. One exam-
ple is the pastoralism development project in the north-
ern province of Tavush that is supported by France’s 
Conseil départemental des Hauts-de-Seine (a regional 
council), the Fonds arménien de France and the Center 
for Agribusiness and Rural Development (CARD), 
a one-stop agricultural development board that is sup-
ported by a number of international donors and inter-
national NGOs. Their purpose is to promote Armenian 
regional products through processing methods that not 
only include ancestral knowledge but also comply with 
current standards with a solid training of the workforce. 
A number of corporate structures also started to tap into 
Armenia’s agrarian and agro-industrial potential, such 
as the ACBA-Crédit agricole bank, which provides rural 
micro-crediting and Pernod-Ricard’s purchase of Arme-
nian brandy factories. Unfortunately, these corporate 
structures have received minimal advertisements. These 
structures are the ones, however, that should be encour-
aged so that Armenia is able to offer diversified and sus-
tainable methods of recovery of its agricultural produc-
tion and of its productive land area.
Translated from the French by Bruno De Cordier
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Figure 1: Armenian Agricultural Output 1995–2014
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vegetables
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eggs (million pieces)
wool (in tens of tons)
grains potatoes vegetables watermelons fruits andberries grapes meat milk
eggs (million
pieces)
wool (in tens of
tons)
2014 590,6 733,2 954,6 245,8 291 261,3 92,7 700,4 641,8 147,7
2010 326,4 482 707,6 132,5 128,5 222,9 69,5 600,9 702,2 118,8
2005 396,2 564,2 663,8 117,8 315,6 164,4 56 594,6 518,2 130,6
2000 224,8 290,3 375,7 52,8 128,5 115,8 49,3 452,1 385,4 131
1995 254,5 427,5 450,9 54 146,1 154,9 48,4 428,3 197,6 146,3
2014
2010
2005
2000
1995
Source: Virginie-Anne Dubois, on the bases of data of the National Statistics Service of the Republic of Armenia, Statistical yearbook 
of Armenia, 2015, <www.armstat.am>
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Figure 2: Armenian Trade Balance 1996–2014
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
imports 856 892 902 811 884 877 987 1.279 1.351 1.802 2.192 3.268 4.426 3.321 3.749 4.145 4.261 4.386 4.424
exports 290 232 221 232 300 342 505 686 723 974 985 1.152 1.057 710 1.041 1.334 1.380 1.479 1.547
trade balance -566 -660 -682 -579 -584 -535 -482 -593 -628 -828 -1.20 -2.11 -3.36 -2.61 -2.70 -2.81 -2.88 -2.90 -2.87
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Source: Virginie-Anne Dubois, on the bases of data of the National Statistics Service of the Republic of Armenia, Statistical yearbook 
of Armenia, 2015, <www.armstat.am>
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One Region, Three Predicaments?
Discussions of food security in the Southern Cauca-
sus region generally focus around food independence 
and are often overwhelmed by agricultural develop-
ment policies. It is quite understandable why this occurs. 
In this region, visions for agricultural development are 
driven by a strongly grounded perception that agricul-
tural development could hold the key to improvements 
in employment, poverty reduction, economic growth 
and security. These are important issues, although they 
are production-oriented. In contrast, the definition of 
food security used by the FAO [Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations] is far more con-
sumption-oriented. In our analysis, we try to combine 
both production and consumption issues.
To understand the likely trajectories for food secu-
rity in the region, it is also important to understand 
the economic and political context within which this 
is occurring.
Despite being close neighbors, the Southern Cau-
casian countries are substantially different in a range 
of important ways. The most defining characteris-
tic of Azerbaijan’s economic context is its oil and gas 
resources. This provides massive resources to support 
economic development and public services. However, it 
also encourages “Dutch disease,” namely, problems of 
economic unification that undermine economic diver-
sity and promote dependence and corruption. The big-
gest food security risk for Azerbaijan in the long term 
is whether hydrocarbon resources will make the coun-
try fully dependent on food-imports without creating 
growth in the non-extractive sectors.
Second, all three states are only partial democracies, 
but differ significantly on their levels of democratization. 
This impacts the general governance environment, which 
subsequently impacts food security. In The Economist’s 
democracy index for 2015, Georgia is ranked the 82nd 
most democratic; Armenia is 116th, and Azerbaijan is 
140th out of a total of 167 countries. Armenia and Azer-
baijan both experience considerable corruption, which 
makes public policy in any area difficult, particularly 
if the policy involves the distribution of resources. In 
the food security sector, this also means that Armenia 
and Azerbaijan face higher-than-necessary local prices 
as a result of corruption on the border and “market cap-
ture” by local sector monopolists inside the country.
The third major contextual issue is the geopoliti-
cal orientation of the country. Armenia has recently 
dropped its plans to join the Association Agreement 
with the European Union, opting instead to join the 
Eurasian Customs Union. At least for the time being, 
Azerbaijan remains uninvolved, while Georgia has just 
signed the EU’s Association Agreement. This may cause 
Armenia to expand its food exports to Russia, while 
Azerbaijan and Georgia would face an external tariff 
if trying to sell to the region. On the other side, Geor-
gia will experience considerable pressure to align its 
phytosanitary, nutritional and health standards with 
the EU. This should improve food safety but may also 
increase food prices. Access to the EU market for Geor-
gian goods could be a huge opportunity for producers 
but will depend on how successfully it makes the nec-
essary changes and modifies its production processes to 
suit EU supply chains.
The Shackles of Import
The latter represents a considerable challenge for Georgia, 
as its food production sector is currently very weak and 
is grounded on the recently emerged, rural, small holders 
strata that has been re-born upon the crash of totali-
tarian socialist system as a  result of massive land pri-
vatization during the early 1990s. Smallholder farmers 
are at the heart of Georgian agriculture, with almost 
700,000 small farms (with one hectare of land as an 
How to Handle Food Security in the Light of Agricultural Development. 
A Look at Georgia Through the Southern Caucasus
Levan Dadiani, Tbilisi
Abstract
Food security encompasses not only thorough and strategic planning for agriculture but also careful con-
siderations for health and education. This article presents a brief overview of the issues in relation to policies 
and strategies to be addressed in Georgia and the Southern Caucasus that are aimed at ensuring food secu-
rity and improving nutrition, the key for which is the improvement of the competitiveness of local farmers 
and the increase in local food production. This requires complex support policies and programs favoring 
small-scale farmers through providing resources and education, land reforms, promoting biodiversity, devel-
oping infrastructure, supporting growth in export of agricultural products as well as promoting and saturat-
ing local markets with locally produced quality and nutritious food.
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average) and with 53% of the working population being 
(self-) employed in this sector. Despite its high agricul-
tural potential, Georgia has significantly low agricultural 
productivity due to its low competitiveness. As a result, 
with over 70% of its food products being imported, it 
is highly import-dependent. Consequently, Georgia has 
disproportionately high food prices. On average, 54% of 
the household income of the population is spent on food. 
The country and its society run a high risk of physical 
and economic inaccessibility of diversified and nutri-
tious food, particularly in mountainous regions, mak-
ing the country food insecure.
Fourteen percent of the households in Georgia sys-
tematically borrow money to purchase food, and due to 
logistical constraints, such as poor infrastructure and nat-
ural calamities, food availability is more unreliable in its 
high mountainous regions. In addition, non-communi-
cable diseases, child stunting and obesity, all of which are 
linked to nutrition deprivation, have become some of the 
biggest challenges that the nation faces today. Non-com-
municable disease is the leading cause of death in Geor-
gia, accounting for over 90% of deaths in total. Therefore, 
how can Georgia shape its food systems to ensure better 
food security and improved nutrition for the population? 
The level of food security in a country is strongly deter-
mined by the functioning of its food system. Public and 
private investments addressing gaps on either the supply or 
demand side can contribute to shaping healthy food sys-
tems that encourage healthy diets and improved nutrition.
Investments, however, need to be suited to the level 
of development in the agriculture sector of the country, 
which can then be accompanied with gradual layers of 
more complex investments. Therefore, in light of the 
current situation, a greater emphasis needs to be placed 
on investments targeted at increasing the productivity 
of smallholder producers, which can replace imports, 
stabilize food prices, and reduce susceptibility to global 
food price shocks. An overhaul of agricultural policies 
and state interventions could lead to healthier food sys-
tems. Food systems influence the availability and acces-
sibility of diverse, nutritious foods, and thus, the abil-
ity of consumers to choose healthy diets. Therefore, if 
Georgia strengthened the link between agriculture and 
nutrition in policy design, it could considerably sup-
port advancing nutrition. To close the circle for both 
food security and nutrition outcomes policies in differ-
ent sectors, common objectives must be supported; the 
best way to achieve this is through continuous inter-
ministerial cooperation.
The State as a Catalyst
The current government of Georgia has already taken 
important steps in this direction. The Ministry of Agri-
culture has set up a multi-agency working group com-
prised of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Edu-
cation, the Ministry of Regional Infrastructure and 
a number of NGOs, mandated to develop a plan and 
strategy to supply healthy and safe food to schools and 
preschools. The Ministry of Health has also elaborated 
and approved guidelines for healthy food in schools 
with menus and recommendations. It is only advisory 
in nature and can be used to introduce healthy food in 
schools. This approach, while commendable, can be fur-
ther strengthened by creating direct links to local pro-
duction through public procurements. Two excellent 
examples are the Hungarian school canteen and the 
Brazilian school feeding programs. These state interven-
tions not only support smallholder farmers to access local 
markets but also simultaneously contribute to nutri-
tional outcomes.
In addition, Georgia has drafted a national nutrition 
strategy that explicitly refers to food access, availabil-
ity, and the importance of food production and import 
substitution. Investments discussed in this article can 
complement the national nutrition strategy, as invest-
ments increase a stable food supply to the population. 
The current context of globalization and market liberal-
ization further exacerbates the challenges to food secu-
rity in Georgia. The recently signed Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the 
EU places considerable pressure on the country. On 
the one hand, it can increase the diversity and quality 
of available food on the market. On the other hand, it 
has a potential to pose a serious risk of further under-
mining local production development unless suitable 
policies are put in place to mitigate the risks for small-
holders. The DCFTA Agreement requires Georgia to 
reform its regulations on food safety standards. While 
this may significantly boost the export of agricultural 
products, there is a risk that it will take considerably 
longer to harmonize food safety regulations to that of 
EU standards than for EU products to flood the Geor-
gian market, potentially giving EU member states an 
unfair advantage over Georgian producers.
What to Do?
It is now more important than ever for Georgia to focus 
on import substitution, increase the competitiveness 
of small holders in a  globalized market, and design 
impact-oriented long-term investments while focusing 
on improved nutrition. Expanding exports is impor-
tant for the economic prosperity of Georgia. However, 
rather than focusing solely on products with high export 
potential (e.g., wine and hazelnuts) and neglecting other 
products necessary for nutritional diversity, it is also cru-
cial that the government make nutritional outcomes also 
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a priority. Going from state-led interventions to private 
property agriculture and independent farms, this type of 
market transition demands changes in the expectations of 
both the government and farmers. Farmers must be moti-
vated and capable of learning and receiving information, 
while also innovating and meeting market challenges.
To achieve something for the sake of small-scale 
farmers, such government interventions should not be 
purely social relief in nature. Instead, they should be 
supporting business-oriented farmers and their organ-
izations, assisting in local market development, infra-
structure, transport, water management and clear land 
legislation, designing long-term support programs as 
well as building capacity and education. Small holders 
need access to information and extension services to 
keep up with the changing market, to enable them to 
optimally use resources, and to adopt innovative and 
cost efficient practices. Effectively establishing exten-
sion services requires significant financial investment 
by the government. The international experience shows 
positive outcomes in strengthening extension services: 
China, India and the US serve as examples of countries 
that have substantially invested in extension services and 
received double the amount in turnover.
As we experience on-going economic transition in 
Georgia, it is important to understand that the demand 
for local products may not remain the same. The global 
history on similar issues has a lot to teach us in terms 
of investing in popularizing rural life. Promoting local 
production and supporting small family farms increases 
the availability of quality products on the market and 
can also preserve tradition and culture. The promo-
tion of local production can be accomplished through 
local gastronomy, rural tourism and traditional culinary 
practices. Equally important is creating the demand 
for locally grown and nutritious food. In that respect, 
Oxfam in Georgia has launched a campaign, branded 
as “Local production, Healthy food”, to inform stake-
holders and the public of nutrition and food security. It 
advocates for political institutionalization of food secu-
rity and nutrition as well as inclusive policies for small-
holder farmers. It executes a public-facing campaign on 
nutrition, raising awareness of the importance of a diver-
sified diet and the effects of malnutrition.
Triple Win
As a long-term perspective, the government would also be 
encouraged to adopt a similar approach towards launch-
ing long-term educational campaigns, creating a demand, 
and as a result, linking local producers with previously 
untapped markets, such as schools, creating rural and 
urban linkages, etc. The U.S. also provides a noteworthy 
practice in this area through the “Buy fresh, Buy local!” 
program, which targets consumers through education 
and outreach components. These include pilot projects, 
such as nutrition education built into the curriculum of 
various schools. As a result of the program, local food 
purchases from restaurants, food cooperatives, and local 
institutions increased by over a million dollars. Geor-
gia, as a state and society, faces a unique opportunity to 
beneficially utilize its attractive potential in agricultural 
produce and if performed right can improve food secu-
rity and nutrition. It also has the opportunity to establish 
strong links between nutrition, traditional gastronomy 
and agriculture. If investments can target rural infrastruc-
ture, facilitate access to credit and markets for small and 
medium producers and support agro-tourism, it can sig-
nificantly change the dynamics of rural life in the country 
as well as create positive outcomes in areas of the triple 
win: critical growth, poverty reduction and food security.
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Agricultural Statistics and Maps
Figure 1: Agricultural and Other Primary Sector Employment Vis-à-Vis Other Sectors in the 
2010s (% of the Active Population)
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Figure 2: The Share of Agricultural Land in the southern Caucasus (2014, in 1,000 Hectares)
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The figures may differ from figures used by the authors in the respective articles. 
Table 1 : The Share of Value-Added Agriculture in the Gross Domestic Product of the Southern 
Caucasian Countries in 1995 and in 2014 (in % of Official GDP)
agriculture industry and extraction tertiary sector
1995 2014 1995 2014 1995 2014
Armenia 42.3 20.8 32 28.6 25.8 50.6
Azerbaijan 27.3 5.2 33.6 58.3 39.1 36
Georgia 52.2 9.3 15.8 24 32.1 66.7
Source: Bruno De Cordier, on the bases of figures from The World Bank Development Indicators database.
Source : Bruno De Cordier, on the bases of figures from The World Bank Development Indicators and   the Food and Agriculture Organ-
isation Statistics Division databases. 
Source : Bruno De Cordier, on the bases of figures the Food and Agriculture Organisation Statistics Division database
CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 88, 26 October 2016 16
Figure 3: Land Type and Land Use in the Southern Caucasus (2014, % of Area)
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Figure 4: Rural Population (1989 and 2015, % of Total Population) and Rural Poverty Rate 
(2014, % of Rural Population) in the Southern Caucasus
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Source: Bruno De Cordier, on the bases of figures the Food and Agriculture Organisation Statistics Division database.
Source: Bruno De Cordier, on the bases of figures and extrapolations from The World Bank Development Indicators and the Rural Pov-
erty Portal of the International Fund for Agricultural Development.
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CHRONICLE
Compiled by Lili Di Puppo
For the full chronicle since 2009 see <www.laender-analysen.de/cad>
23 September – 14 October 2016
23 September 2016 Low-cost airline company Wizz Air opens a base at the airport of the Georgian town of Kutaisi and offers 
seven new routes
26 September 2016 Azerbaijan holds a referendum on 29 constitutional amendments. The most important of the proposed 
changes is an extension of the president’s term of office from five to seven years. The Central Election Com-
mission announces that the turnout was over 63 percent. The following day the Commission declares that 
nearly 85 percent of voters supported the extension of the presidential term.
27 September 2016 Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili speaks of the necessity to “rebuild bridges” between Abkha-
zians and Georgians during a ceremony to mark the 23rd anniversary of the “fall of Sukhumi”
30 September 2016 Pope Francis meets with Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili during his visit to Georgia and calls for 
the peaceful coexistence of peoples and states in the region 
30 September 2016 The Azerbaijani Parliament votes to resume relations with the European Parliament that had been suspended 
following the EU’s criticism of human rights abuses in Azerbaijan.
1 October 2016 Pope Francis holds a stadium mass in Tbilisi and preaches peace and religious tolerance during his visit to 
Georgia
2 October 2016 Pope Francis leads a Sunday mass in Baku and meets with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev during his 
visit to Azerbaijan
4 October 2016 The car of Georgian opposition party member Givi Targamadze is destroyed by an explosion in a suspected 
bombing in Tbilisi
5 October 2016 EU ambassadors approve the start of negotiations on visa liberalization for Georgia between the European 
Council and the European Parliament 
5 October 2016 Chinese Commerce Minister Gao Hucheng and Georgian Economy Minister Dimitri Kumsishvili sign a 
memorandum of understanding on concluding free trade negotiations in Tbilisi
7 October 2016 A court in Azerbaijan rejects an appeal by investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova to clear her record of 
charges of illegal entrepreneurship
8 October 2016 Georgia holds parliamentary elections with the Georgian Dream ruling coalition claiming to have won at 
least 58 percent of the vote
8 October 2016 Men attempting to storm a polling station in a village near Georgia’s capital of Tbilisi clash with police; the 
Georgian Interior Ministry blames the opposition party UNM for the violence
9 October 2016 The Central Election Commission announces the results of the proportional representation part of parlia-
mentary elections in Georgia with close to 49 percent of the votes for the Georgian Dream party and about 
27 percent for the United National Movement opposition party. 77 parliamentary seats are assigned on the 
basis of proportional representation. A further 73 deputies are elected through a two-round system in sin-
gle-member constituencies with majority rule. The second round of voting will take place on 30 October
10 October 2016 The leader of the Georgian Free Democrats opposition party, Irakli Alasania, announces that he is quitting 
politics temporarily and withdraws from the race for a parliamentary seat for the town of Gori
11 October 2016 The United National Movement opposition party in Georgia votes against boycotting Parliament and in 
favor of contesting majoritarian MP seats in the second round of voting
13 October 2016 Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev meets with his Georgian counterpart Giorgi Margvelashvili in Tbil-
isi and reiterates his country’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity
14 October 2016 Georgia signs an agreement in Sarajevo to join Europe’s Energy Community
14 October 2016 Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili visits a US warship making a port call in the Black Sea coast 
town of Batumi
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